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____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Before us is an appeal by NationsBank of Tennessee (Collateral Trustee) and New 
Jersey National Bank, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, and Boatman's First National Bank of 
Oklahoma (First, Second, and Third Priority Secured Equipment Certificate Trustees), who 
are collectively referred to in this opinion as the "Trustees," from the order entered by 
the district court in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding of Continental Airlines, Inc. 
dismissing as moot three appeals by the Trustees.  Those appeals were from orders of the 
bankruptcy court which 1) denied the Trustees' Renewed Motion for adequate protection, 
2) confirmed Continental's revised second amended joint plan of reorganization, and 
denied the Trustees' motion for the establishment of a cash deposit of $123,479,287.  In 
essence, the Appellant Trustees seek payment for an asserted administrative claim of 
approximately $117 million against the reorganized company.  The Appellee, Continental 
Airlines, Inc., defends the district court's mootness ruling and argues, in the 
alternative, that the underlying rulings of the bankruptcy court were correct as a matter 
of law and fact.   
I.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Continental filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on December 3, 1990.  
Appellant Trustees serve as successor Collateral and Series Trustees for certificate 
holders who had provided Continental with operating capital.  The certificates were 
secured at the time of Continental's petition by a pool of 29 commercial aircraft with 
engines, and 81 additional jet engines which, we were advised, serviced about one-third of 
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Continental's operating fleet.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in possession, which 
has most of the rights, powers, functions and duties of a trustee, see 11 U.S.C. § 
1107(a), "may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice 
or a hearing."  11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1).   
 Section 363(e) provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of 
an entity that has an interest in property used . . . by the [debtor in 
possession], the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition 
such use . . . as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.  
 
 
11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
 On February 21, 1991, First Fidelity Bank of New Jersey, predecessor to 
NationsBank as Collateral Trustee, filed a motion along with many other aircraft lessors 
and financiers alleging, inter alia, a decline in the value of the collateral and seeking 
adequate protection under section 363(e).  First Fidelity later withdrew from this motion, 
but on June 28, 1991 it, and the predecessors of the other Appellant Trustees, filed a 
motion seeking similar relief.  The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion from September 3 through September 6, 1991 limited to the Trustees' assertion that 
they were entitled to adequate protection payments as a result of the collateral's post
petition decline in market value.   
 Continental argued, inter alia, that because the Trustees had not filed a motion 
for relief from the automatic stay, they were not entitled to an award of adequate 
protection under section 363(e).  The bankruptcy court ruled on the Trustees' motio
August 27, 1992, rejecting that argument but finding as a fact, based on the "Blue Books," 
a publication issued by a company that appraises aircraft, that the market value of the 
collateral had not declined during the period at issue in the motion.  In re Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 536 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) [hereinafter Continental I].    
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 On August 14, 1992, approximately two weeks before the opinion in Continental I
was issued, the Trustees filed a motion under section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to 
lift the automatic stay ("Lift-Stay Motion").  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  This section 
permits a creditor to move for relief from the automatic stay of delineated activities, 
such as repossession of collateral, effected by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 On September 14, 1992, the Trustees also filed a renewed motion for adequate 
protection for alleged decline in the collateral's value for the period after September 
1991, when the original 1991 motion was argued ("Renewed Motion").  There were various 
hearings on the Renewed Motion between November 3, 1992 and February 5, 1993.  Toward the 
end of that period, the Trustees filed a motion dated January 29, 1993, asking the 
bankruptcy court to establish a cash deposit of some $123 million, of which $117 million 
was attributable to alleged market decline, to preserve what the Trustees claimed was the 
administrative priority status of the Trustees' adequate protection claim if Continental 
emerged from bankruptcy as a reorganized debtor ("Deposit Motion").   
 During this period efforts to reorganize the debtor continued.  On November 9, 
1992 Continental entered into an Investment Agreement under which the Investors (Air 
Partners, L.P. and Air Canada) agreed and committed to an investment of $450 million in 
the reorganized entity under a complex arrangement and subject to certain conditions.  
App. at 391 et seq.  One of those conditions relevant to this proceeding was a limitation 
on the amount and nature of liabilities and administrative expense claims required to be 
assumed by or attributable to the reorganized company.  App. at 408.  On January 13, 1993 
Continental filed a second amended joint plan of reorganization ("Plan") which referenced 
that Investment Agreement.  The Plan provided, inter alia, for assumption of "allowed 
administrative claims" by the reorganized Continental. App. at 656.    
 The confirmation hearing was held for a number of days during the period March 
16, 1993 through April 16, 1993.  The parties reached a settlement on April 12 concerning 
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adequate protection due to use and/or maintenance of the collateral by Continental, and no 
issue relating to use decline (the impairment in value attributable to the use of the 
collateral by the debtor in possession) is before us.  The parties did not settle the 
Trustees' adequate protection claims based on decline in market value.   
 At the conclusion of the confirmation hearing on April 16, 1993, the bankruptcy 
court denied the Deposit Motion and the Renewed Motion.  In a published opinion, the court 
held that it was necessary for the Trustees to have sought relief from the automatic stay 
to be entitled to adequate protection for market value decline; that therefore the 
Trustees were not entitled to adequate protection due to market decline until after the 
date of their Lift-Stay Motion, i.e. August 14, 1992; and that no decline in the market 
value of the collateral had taken place since that date.  In re Continental Airlines, 
Inc., 154 B.R. 176 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) [hereinafter Continental II].  Also on April 16, 
1993, the bankruptcy court signed the Confirmation Order.  The court made a series of 
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law underlying the Confirmation Order which 
will be referred to throughout this opinion when pertinent. 
 On April 20, 1993 the Trustees filed three notices of appeal to the district 
court from the bankruptcy court's denial of the Renewed Motion for Adequate Protection, 
its denial of the Deposit Motion, and its order confirming the Plan.  Two days later,
Trustees filed a motion for a partial stay of the consummation of the Plan ("Conditional 
Stay Motion"), but filed that motion in the district court, which referred them to the 
bankruptcy court.  On April 26, 1993, the Trustees filed a stay request in the bankruptcy 
court.  Because the bankruptcy judge was not available, the hearing on the motion was held 
the next day in the district court, which ruled that the Trustees were likely to prevail 
on appeal but denied the stay because the Trustees were "unable to post a bond 
satisfactory to the Court." App. at 1755-56.  With no stay impeding implementation of the 
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Plan which had now been confirmed, the Investors proceeded to close the transaction by 
making their promised investment. 
 On May 6, 1993 Continental filed a motion in the district court to dismiss the 
Trustees' appeals as moot, which the district court granted on December 30, 1993.  The 
Trustees filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration in light of the decision in 
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 
1993) [hereinafter Chateaugay II], which the court denied.  The Trustees filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
 The merits issues on which the parties divide present interesting and 
challenging questions of first impression for this court, and some appear not to have been 
decided by any appellate court.  The Trustees argue that neither the Bankruptcy  
Code nor any reliable precedent supports the bankruptcy court's holding that a creditor 
must file a motion to lift the automatic stay as a prerequisite to seeking adequate 
protection.  They argue that this is a matter of law that this court can decide de novo 
even though the district court did not reach the issue. They further argue that the 
bankruptcy court's finding that there was no diminution in the market value of the 
Trustees' collateral after they filed their Lift-Stay Motion was clearly erroneous. 
Finally, they argue that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law in denying their 
motion for the establishment of a cash deposit.  
 Not surprisingly, Continental, as appellee, defends both the bankruptcy court's 
legal determination that the Trustees could not assert adequate protection claims for 
alleged market value decline during the period before they moved for relief from the 
automatic stay and its factual conclusion that there had been no substantial decline in 
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the value of the collateral since the Lift-Stay Motion was filed.  Finally, it argues that 
in any event the Trustees could not recover for adequate protection because the value of 
the collateral did not decline below its value on the petition date, which Continental 
contends is the relevant measure.  
 We would reach these issues only if we were satisfied that the district court 
erred in holding that the Trustees' appeals to it were moot, a decision as to which the 
parties vigorously disagree.  Mootness vel non of the appeals before the district court is 
closely related to, if not indistinguishable from, the question whether the appeal to this 
court is moot, an issue which Continental alludes to in its brief.  For convenience, we 
will refer to mootness in the district court unless we state otherwise. 
 Continental does not contend that the appeals to the district court or to us 
were moot in the constitutional sense, implicating the case or controversy requirement of 
Article III, §1.  See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1975). This is not 
a situation analogous to those where the appeals became moot because the law at issue was 
repealed, see Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972); the 
subject of the election campaign controversy was no longer a candidate, see Golden v. 
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); or the railroad whose application for tariffs was 
contested withdrew that application, see A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States
368 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1961).  
 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recently explained, an appeal is moot in the 
constitutional sense only if events have taken place during the pendency of the appeal 
that make it "impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief whatever.'"  
of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, ___, 113 S. Ct. 447, 449 (1992) (quoting 
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).  An appeal is not moot "merely because a court 
cannot restore the parties to the status quo ante.  Rather, when a court can fashion '
form of meaningful relief,' even if it only partially redresses the grievances of the 
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prevailing party, the appeal is not moot."  RTC v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In re 
Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc) (quoting Church of 
Scientology, 113 S. Ct. at 450). Thus, in Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. v. Sharp Properties, 
Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1993), we concluded that because we could impose at least 
one of the remedies enumerated by the appellant, and thereby provide it "some effective 
relief," the appeal was not moot.  That is not the issue in this case.  
 Instead, Continental invokes the broader interpretation of mootness applied in 
bankruptcy cases, often referred to as "equitable mootness."  See, e.g., Manges v. 
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995); In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 
1993);  Official Comm. of Unsecured  
Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV 
Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter 
Chateaugay I]; Rochman v. Northeast Utils. Serv. Group (In re Public Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 
469, 471-72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); First Union Real Estate 
Equity & Mortgage Invs. v. Club Assocs. (In re Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th 
Cir. 1992); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., 
Inc., 841 F.2d 92, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1988); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir
1986); Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793, 796-
Cir. 1981).  Under this widely recognized and accepted doctrine, the courts have held that 
"[a]n appeal should . . . be dismissed as moot when, even though effective relief could 
conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable."  Chateaugay 
I, 988 F.2d at 325. 
 In a trenchant discussion of the issue in a recent decision of the Seventh 
Circuit, the court noted that denominating the doctrine as "equitable mootness" is 
misleading. In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509 
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(1994).  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, stated:  "[t]here is a big difference 
between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and unwillingness to alter the 
outcome ('equitable mootness').  Using one word for two different concepts breeds 
confusion." Id. (emphasis in original).  Thus, although the discussions and applications 
of the concept of "mootness" in bankruptcy cases by that court had previously encompassed 
what is referred to elsewhere as "equitable mootness," see Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 
1048; In re Andreuccetti, 975 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 1992), the court in UNR Industries
stated it would now "banish 'equitable mootness' from the (local) lexicon." 20 F.3d at 
769.  Instead, the court continued, "[w]e ask not whether this case is moot, 'equitably' 
or otherwise, but whether it is prudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late 
date."  Id. 
 These "equitable" or "prudential" considerations focus on "concerns unique to 
bankruptcy proceedings."  Manges, 29 F.3d at 1038.  Whether termed "equitable mootness" or 
a prudence doctrine, we see no reason why this court should part company with our sister 
circuits in their adoption of this doctrine.  If limited in scope and cautiously applied, 
this doctrine provides a vehicle whereby the court can prevent substantial harm to 
numerous parties.   
 The Trustees have not challenged the viability of the doctrine of equitable 
mootness or application of prudential considerations in bankruptcy cases, nor have they 
cited to a case in any circuit that rejects the concept.  Instead, they rely most heavily 
on a decision of the Second Circuit holding that even though the reorganization plan for 
the bankrupt LTV Corporation had been confirmed, the appeal of tax lessors challenging the 
plan's failure to give their claims administrative priority was not moot.  See Chateaugay 
II, 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993). Significantly, the court in Chateaugay II did not quarrel 
with the doctrine, merely its application in that case.  In fact, in RTC v. Best Prods. 
Co. (In re Best Prod. Co.), 68 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1995), a more recent case from the 
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Second Circuit, the court once again emphasized the language in Chateaugay I that even 
though an appeal may not be moot in the sense of Article III of the Constitution, it may 
be deemed moot in bankruptcy cases because of "equitable considerations." 
 We have generally stated that we exercise plenary  
review of a district court's decision on mootness.  See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. 
McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1991); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly
815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987).  In those cases our focus was on constitutional 
mootness.  It is surprising, but we have not seen any discussion of our standard of review 
of a district court's determination that a bankruptcy appeal to it was moot for equitable 
or prudential reasons.  Under ordinary review principles, we would review that decision 
for abuse of discretion.  A particular case may also raise legal and/or factual issues 
interspersed with the prudential ones, and then the applicable review standard, plenary or 
clearly erroneous, would apply. 
 
B. 
 Factors that have been considered by courts in determining whether it would be 
equitable or prudential to reach the merits of a bankruptcy appeal include (1) whether the 
reorganization plan has been substantially consummated, (2) whether a stay has been 
obtained, (3) whether the relief requested would affect the rights of parties not before 
the court, (4) whether the relief requested would affect the success of the plan, and (5) 
the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy judgments.  See Manges, 29 F.3d at 
1039; Rochman, 963 F.2d at 471-72. 
 The foremost consideration has been whether the reorganization plan has been 
substantially consummated, especially where the reorganization involves intricate 
transactions, see Rochman, 963 F.2d at 473-74 (performance under plan involved "numero
complex arrangements"); Roberts Farms, 652 F.2d at 797 (plan involved "many intricate and 
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involved transactions" and reversal of plan's confirmation "would knock the props out from 
under" such transactions and "create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the 
Bankruptcy Court"), or where outside investors have relied on the confirmation of the 
plan, see Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039 (equitable mootness "protects the interests of non
adverse third parties who are not before the reviewing court but who have acted in 
reliance upon the plan as implemented"); UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 770 ("[b]y protecting the 
interests of persons who acquire assets in reliance on a plan of reorganization, a court 
increases the price the estate can realize ex ante, and thus produces benefits for 
creditors in the aggregate"); Rochman, 963 F.2d at 474 (reorganization involved $1.5 
billion in financing from 100,000 sources); Club Assocs., 956 F.2d at 1070 ("a number of 
investors, who were not parties to this case, had committed new funds to the 'reemerged 
Club' with the expectation of receiving a preferred return on their investments"). 
 "Substantial consummation" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as: "(A) transfer 
of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) 
assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business 
or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; 
and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan."  11 U.S.C. § 1101(2).  In such 
instances, the strong public interest in the finality of bankruptcy reorganizations is 
particularly compelling.     
 The district court dismissed the appeals to it as moot based on the conclusions, 
set forth in its opinion dated December 30, 1993, that substantial consummation of the 
Plan had occurred, the Investors had already made their $450 million investment into the 
reorganized entity, all elements of the Plan, except distributions to the unsecured 
creditors, had been completed, and a reversal of the order confirming the Plan likely 
would put Continental back into bankruptcy.  App. at 1873.  The court also noted that 
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Continental had implemented the Plan following its approval by the court because the 
Trustees had failed to obtain a stay. 
 The Trustees do not challenge that there had been substantial consummation by 
December 1993, when the district court dismissed the appeals as moot.  They suggest that 
as their object is not to disturb the reorganization, but only to get payment from the 
reorganized Continental for their adequate protection claim measured by the market value 
decline of the collateral during bankruptcy, the line of cases upon which Continental 
relies is inapplicable.  We cannot agree, because the rejection of the Trustees' claim by 
the bankruptcy court was inextricably intertwined with the implementation of the 
reorganization.  See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1148 (to evaluate mootness, court must 
"scrutinize each individual claim, testing the feasibility of granting the relief against 
its potential impact on the reorganization scheme as a whole").  Thus, the Trustees cannot 
avoid the effect of the substantial consummation of the reorganization plan so readily.  
 Inasmuch as Continental agrees that the issue is not constitutional mootness but 
prudential mootness, we may assume that even after substantial or total consummation of 
its reorganization, some effective relief would have been and still is available for the 
Trustees' claim.  It is quite another matter in light of the substantial, indeed 
irrevocable, change in the status quo to determine that it would have been equitable for 
the court to reach the merits of the Trustees' claim.  For the district court had before 
it an unstayed bankruptcy reorganization plan, and many courts have based their prudential 
decisions to decline to consider challenges to bankruptcy court orders on the ground that 
there has been substantial consummation of a plan of reorganization in reliance upon an 
unstayed confirmation order.  See, e.g., Rochman, 963 F.2d at 475. 
 In Chateaugay I, the court noted that although the Bankruptcy Code only requires 
a stay pending appeal in limited circumstances, there is a procedure under Bankruptcy Rule 
8005 to seek to preserve the status quo and "[t]he party who appeals without seeking to 
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avail himself of that protection does so at his own risk."  988 F.2d at 326.  And in 
Manges, the court observed, under the descriptive title "Halting the Runaway Train: the 
Motions to Stay," that "in many of the cases in which bankruptcy appeals were dismissed as 
moot, the appellants failed to seek a stay."  29 F.3d 1039.   
 Even the seeking of a stay may not be enough.  The appellants in In re UNR 
Industries had sought a stay, albeit unsuccessfully, at every opportunity; nonetheless, 
the court noted, "[a] stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the 
implementation of the plan of reorganization." 20 F.3d at 770.  Accord AOV Indus., 792 
F.2d at 1144, 1146-47. 
 Shortly after the confirmation of the Continental Plan, the Trustees filed an 
Emergency Motion for Conditional Stay of Order Confirming the Plan pending their appeal to 
the district court.  The condition the Trustees sought in lieu of a stay was the 
establishment of a segregated account for $117 million, the full amount of their adequate 
protection claim, or alternatively at least $22 million, which they claim was the admitted 
decline in the value of the collateral.  See App. at 1721.  In response to the court's 
inquiry, they conceded that they were not willing to post any bond.  The district court 
never required a supersedeas bond in the amount of $450,000,000, as the dissent suggests.  
In fact, the district court tried to ascertain the amount of bond that would be 
reasonable, and the Trustees' general position was that they were "merely the fiduciary of 
the money of their bondholders" and they suggested no lesser amount. App. at 1729.  
 Thus, as one of the reasons for its order denying the stay, the district court 
noted their unwillingness to post a bond satisfactory to the court.  App. at 1756.  
e.g., Central States, 841 F.2d at 95 (appellant's failure to post bond to stay 
confirmation order basis for finding appeal moot).  Because the failure to post the bond 
needed to get a stay permitted the consummation of the plan, this factor weighs heavily in 
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favor of the district court's declination to delve into the merits of the Trustees' 
appeal. 
 The Trustees argue that this court has held that failure to obtain a stay does 
not necessarily render an appeal moot.  The cases to which they refer are not apposite.  
In one, In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1990), the issue was the narrow 
one of the power of the bankruptcy court to excise a paragraph from a shopping center 
lease.  There is no indication in Slocum that there had been any confirmation of a plan 
before or during the appeal.   
 In the more recent case to which the Trustees refer, Megafoods Stores, Inc. v. 
Flagstaff Realty Assocs. (In re Flagstaff Realty Assocs.), 60 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 1995), 
the appeal also presented a narrow landlord-tenant issue, i.e. the effect of confirmation 
of the landlord's plan on a tenant's right to pursue its appeal of the bankruptcy court's 
denial of its recoupment claim.  In holding that it was not necessary for the tenant to 
seek a stay in order to pursue its right to appeal despite the confirmation in the 
interim, we noted the line of cases placing recoupment and setoff in a special category 
and stated, "although we recognize the importance of maintaining the integrity of 
confirmed plans from later attack, these unique circumstances permit the plan to be 
reopened and readjusted." Id. at 1036.  Thus, neither Flagstaff nor Slocum addressed 
equitable or prudential mootness at issue here. 
  The Trustees argue that they had no obligation to take steps to preserve the 
status quo through a stay because the Plan contained "a built-in mechanism for the [post
confirmation] disposition and payment of Disputed Administrative Claims." Appellants' 
Brief at 10.  Assuming arguendo, as Continental does in its brief, that the Plan 
provisions for post-confirmation payment of administrative claims to the extent they have 
been allowed by a "Final Order," App. at 656, 691, 1057, was applicable to a claim of the 
type and magnitude of that asserted by the Trustees, the availability of such a mechanism 
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does not allay all prudential and equitable concerns.  The significant fact is that the 
Trustees' claim was not "allowed" by the bankruptcy court before confirmation, and t
such disallowance was an essential factor in the Investors' decision to proceed to close 
the transaction. 
 One of the concerns of the Investors that needed to be satisfied as a condition 
of their participation was that the total amount that would have to be paid for 
administrative claims could be distorted by a few large claims.  These included, in 
particular, labor claims by airline pilots, large claims by Eastern Airlines, and the 
adequate protection claims of the Appellant Trustees.  To limit their exposure, the 
Investment Agreement provided that the Investors' obligation to proceed with the 
arrangements was subject, inter alia, to the payments and obligations for administrative 
claims being no higher than a specified amount.   
 The bankruptcy court found in its detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order Confirming the Debtors' Revised Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization that 
there was substantial, credible and uncontested evidence that the administrative claims 
payable at confirmation would be within the specified limit of the cap set forth in the 
Investment Agreement. It found that neither the pilots' claims nor the Eastern claims was 
entitled to administrative priority, and that the Trustees' adequate protection claim had 
no value as an administrative claim.  It based its statutorily required determination that 
the Plan was feasible, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), in part on these findings.  App. at 
1548-53.    
  High on the list of prudential considerations taken into account by courts 
considering whether to allow an appeal following a consummated reorganization is the 
reliance by third parties, in particular investors, on the finality of the transaction.  
See Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039 ("[t]he concept of 'mootness' from a prudential standpoint 
protects the interests of non-adverse third parties who are not before the reviewing court 
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but who have acted in reliance upon the plan as implemented"); Rochman, 963 F.3d at 474
(similar).  It seems to be uncontested that if the Trustees' claims at issue here had been 
approved as administrative claims, the total such claims would have greatly exceeded the 
cap specified by the Investors for that purpose.  This would have given the Investors the 
option to withdraw; such withdrawal would have placed the entire Plan in jeopardy.  
 The district court specifically found, in dismissing the Trustees' appeals as 
moot, that the Investors had relied on the bankruptcy court's order and that there was an 
integral nexus between the investment and the success of the Plan.   The court stated, 
"[t]he Investors relied on the unstayed Confirmation Order in making the $450 million 
investment in Continental's Plan.  It is clear that [the Trustees'] requested relief [a 
deposit of $22 million to $117 million for that administrative claim] would undermine the 
grounds which the Investors relied upon in making their investment and would require a 
dismantling of the entire Plan."  App. at 1874.  Although the Trustees argue that this 
finding is erroneous, there is support for it in the record. 
 At the hearing in April 1993 before the district court on the Trustees' request 
for the conditional stay of the Confirmation Order, counsel for the Trustees stated they 
had testimony that "as a matter of business judgment, it would be extremely unlikely for 
the investors to walk away from this deal if . . . a 22-million-dollar deposit was 
established."  App. at 1727.  The Trustees' counsel in effect challenged the Investors to 
assert otherwise, stating that inasmuch as the Investors' counsel were in court they could 
correct any assertions that he made.  Id.   Thereafter, the Investors' attorney rose "to 
make clear the [I]nvestors' position, which is that if the relief is granted to [the 
Trustees] which they seek from the Court this morning [the stay conditioned on a deposit 
of some $22 million to $117 million], then we are not prepared to close the transaction."  
App. at 1744.   
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 The representative of the Investors explained that in the airline business 
"there is a great sensitivity to cash and the capital structure of a reorganized entity," 
and that the relief that the Trustees sought "could significantly impair the capital 
structure that would exist with respect [to] this reorganized airline."  Id. at 1744
He reviewed the negotiations that had occurred for the cap for administrative expense 
liability, advised that the Investors had monitored on a monthly basis Continental's 
performance in that respect, explained that the Investors had insisted that the 
confirmation order address the issue of the Trustees' claim "because we want to make sure 
if we are putting our money in, we are getting the benefit of our bargain, which is a 
reorganized entity with a capital structure that we contemplated."  App. at 1746.  He 
concluded by stating unequivocally that if a stay were entered conditioned upon the bond 
the Trustees sought, then his client "would not be prepared to close this transaction."  
Id.  The Trustees' counsel did not thereafter argue that the Investors' counsel's 
statements were insufficiently probative, and therefore that suggestion here is less than 
persuasive. 
 In response to this evidence of reliance, the Trustees now argue that when the 
Investors closed the transaction they were aware that they were taking a risk that the 
Trustees would be successful on appeal on the law or facts supporting their claim.  The 
record shows, however, that all parties were well aware of the extensive legal precedent 
dismissing as moot appeals from unstayed consummated reorganizations.  See App. at 41
(references in the Investment Agreement); App. at 1729-30, 1741 (argument before the 
district court on the stay).  In light of the long line of cases that recognize the 
prudential considerations that militate against upsetting expectations that formed an
integral part of a complex reorganization, we decline to hold that the Investors were 
unreasonable in proceeding with their investment in reliance on the confirmation order.  
By the time the district court ruled, it was no longer possible to restore the parties to 
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their earlier positions because the investment had been made, and the option to withdraw 
because the administrative claims exceeded the cap was no longer available to the 
Investors.  See Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1049 (claim held moot when its acceptance 
"would amount to imposing a different plan of reorganization on the parties").   
 The Trustees have not presented us with any arguments, other than the 
availability of the post-confirmation mechanism for administrative claims, which would 
weigh against all of the prudential considerations that dictate that this consummated 
reorganization must be left in place.  Following confirmation, Continental was operating 
as a restructured company, and had entered into countless new relationships and 
transactions.  To convince a court to take the action sought by the Trustees which would 
undermine the basis for the Investors' decision to proceed, the Trustees would have to 
proffer a powerful reason indeed. They have not even attempted to do so.   
 Our dissenting colleague does not disagree with the concept, unchallenged by the 
Trustee and universally accepted elsewhere, that equitable considerations may make it 
imprudent to upset a consummated reorganization plan.  Nor do we understand the dissent to 
take issue with our identification of the five considerations relevant to application of 
that doctrine, by whatever name it is denominated.  Instead, the dissent merely disagrees 
with application of that doctrine in this case, based on the dissent's view that the 
Investors factored the possibility of a reversal into their investment decision, and the 
dissent's "serious doubt" that the Investors banked on the 100% probability that the 
Trustees would recover nothing.  Record support for the dissent's view has not been
and the district court, which was far closer to the parties and the events than we are, 
made a finding that there was such reliance by these Investors.  See App. at 1874.  In any 
event, the district court did not base that finding on any "100% probability" factor, an 
issue the dissent has created. 
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 Even more important, the district court reached its conclusion based on more 
than one consideration, principally the facts that the reorganization plan was 
consummated, no stay was obtained, numerous other parties have changed their positions, 
and numerous irrevocable transactions have since been completed as a result of the 
consummation of the Plan. 
 Without listing all of such transactions set forth by Continental in its brief, 
we note that among those are the distribution to unsecured creditors, the merger of 53 
debtors other than Continental with and into Continental, the investment of $110 million 
in cash by Air Partners and Air Canada in the reorganized Continental, the transfer by 
foreign governments of various route authorities, and the assumption by the reorganized 
Continental of unexpired leases and executory contracts worth over $5.0 billion.  Thus, 
the "key issue" really is whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing the 
various equitable factors.  While a judge on this court might reach a different equitable 
balance, we are not prepared to hold that the balance reached by the district court was an 
abuse of its discretion.  
 Under the circumstances presented here, we can see no prudential considerations 
that would support an attempt by an appellate court, district or court of appeals, to 
fashion even a limited remedy for the Trustees.  That would necessarily entail imposing a 
new debt on the reorganized company, which is a different entity than it was when this 
case was before the district court.  Thus, we agree with the determination of the district 
court that the Trustees' claim was moot.  We base our holding on our conclusion that it 
would be neither prudent nor equitable to grant the Trustees the relief they seek. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth we will affirm the order of the district court.
_____________________________ 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The majority's decision in this case is disturbing. Much is at stake.  The 
appellants (the "Trustees") have raised what the majority itself characterizes as 
"interesting and challenging questions of first impression for this court," some of which 
"appear not to have been decided by any appellate court."  Maj. Op. at 8.  The district 
court ruled that the Trustees' arguments were likely to prevail on appeal.  J.A. 1755
The case is clearly not moot in the sense that the courts lack the ability to provide 
meaningful relief, and it seems obvious that the Trustees could receive at least some 
relief without undermining the plan of reorganization.  Indeed, the plan itself contains a 
mechanism for providing such relief, and Continental represented in the bankruptcy court 
that the Trustees would be paid under this provision if their claim was allowed. Despite 
all this, both the district court and the majority have refused to consider the Trustees' 
arguments and have thus left them without a decision on the merits by any Article III 
court. In producing this result, the majority relies on considerations of "prudence" and 
"equity," but in my view such considerations weigh strongly in favor of entertaining the 
Trustees' arguments. 
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 The majority begins its analysis by identifying five factors that have been 
considered by other courts "in determining whether it would be equitable or prudential to 
reach the merits of a bankruptcy appeal."  Maj. Op. at 14.  These are: "(1) whether the 
reorganization plan has been substantially consummated, (2) whether a stay has been 
obtained, (3) whether the relief requested would affect the rights of parties not before 
the court, (4) whether the relief requested would affect the success of the plan, and (5) 
the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy judgments."  Id.   
 In this case, however, these five factors seem to boil down to basically one, 
i.e., whether entertaining the Trustees' claim on the merits would upset any reasonable 
reliance interests.  This is the essence of the third factor listed by the majority 
"whether the relief requested would affect the rights of parties not before the court."  
The fourth factor -- "whether the relief requested would affect the success of the plan" 
- cannot justify the majority's decision to preclude the Trustees from getting any relief.  
(Whether or not the plan of reorganization would be imperilled if the Trustees were 
awarded the full measure of relief that they seek -- a matter of sharp dispute1 -- no one 
could plausibly argue that the Trustees cannot be given any relief without endangering the 
                     
1The district court wrote that "if the Court were to reverse the order confirming the 
Plan, it would likely put Continental back into bankruptcy."  J.A. 1873.  However, the 
Trustees argue: 
 
It is difficult to conceive how a reorganization -- such as Continental's 
that involved the restructuring of over $71 billion in debt, and resulted in 
shareholder equity of $610 million, could somehow become financially imperilled 
by the allowance of the Trustees' adequate protection claim. . . .  Indeed, not 
a single shred of evidence exists in the record to indicate -- or even suggest 
- that Continental would be compelled to dismantle its Plan or to file another 
bankruptcy if the Trustees were to prevail on their adequate protection claim.   
 
Appellants' Br. at 24 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
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plan.)   And the remaining factors seem to be largely, if not entirely, subsumed within 
factors three and four.2   
 For these reasons, it seems to me that the key issue in this case is whether the 
investors in NewCal (the "Investors") or others reasonably relied on the prediction that 
the Trustees would recover nothing on their claim.3  If they did, then it might be unfair 
to upset their reliance interests.  If they did not, I see nothing unfair about 
entertaining that claim on the merits.   
 In considering the question of reliance, I will start with the Investors because 
their plight looms large in the analyses of the majority and the district court.  When the 
Investors decided to invest $450 million in NewCal they knew or should have known that 
under the reorganization plan NewCal would be required to pay the Trustees' claim if it 
was ultimately allowed.  Section 10.1 of the plan provided that NewCal would pay "Allowed 
Administrative Claims."  Moreover, in order to persuade the bankruptcy court to reject the 
Trustees' request that a cash reserve be established prior to confirmation to cover their 
claim, Continental argued that such a reserve was unnecessary because if the Trustees' 
claim was allowed it would be "an Allowed Administrative Claim which would be paid in 
accordance with the terms of Section 10.1 of the Plan."  J.A. 1039.  In addition, when the 
                     
22.   As the majority seems to recognize (see Maj. Op. at 14), the first factor 
(substantial consummation) is important in large part because investors and others are 
likely to have relied on a plan once this stage is reached.  In addition, I would suppose 
that substantial consummation also marks the point at which the policy against disturbing 
a reorganization plan (factor four) comes prominently into play.  The same would appear to 
be true of the second factor (the absence of a stay) since, as the majority notes (Maj. 
Op. at 15), the lack of a stay "permit[s] substantial consummation."  Maj. Op. at 14
And as for the fifth factor ("the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy 
judgments"), if entertaining the Trustees' appeal would not upset reasonable reliance 
interests or undermine the reorganization, it is difficult to see why this public policy 
would be offended. 
3Continental frames the central issue in similar terms, stating: "The relevant question is 
. . . whether providing the requested relief would inequitably injure the interests of 
those whose actions in reliance upon the unstayed Confirmation Order resulted in 
substantial consummation."  Appellee's Br. at 11.  
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Investors made their investment, the bankruptcy court's denial of the Trustees' claim was 
already on appeal to the district court.  Under these circumstances, any prudent investor, 
in deciding whether to invest in NewCal on particular terms, would have taken into account 
the range and likelihood of possible outcomes in the Trustees' appeal, including the 
possibility that the appeal would be successful in whole or in part.  No reasonable 
investor would have proceeded on the assumption that there was a 100% probability that the 
Trustees would recover nothing.  Consequently, we would not be upsetting any reason
reliance interests by holding that the Trustees' arguments should be considered on the 
merits.   
 In response to this argument, the majority writes: 
The record shows . . . that all parties were well aware of the 
extensive legal precedent dismissing as moot appeals from unstayed 
consummated reorganizations. . . .  In light of the long line of cases 
that recognize the prudential considerations that militate against 
upsetting expectations that formed an integral part of a complex 
reorganization, we decline to hold that the Investors were 
unreasonable in proceeding with their investment in reliance on the 
confirmation order.   
 
Maj. Op. at 23.   
 If I correctly understand this passage, its reasoning is circular.  According to 
the majority, it was reasonable for the Investors to rely on the Trustees' losing because 
the Investors had a reasonable basis for concluding that if they reasonably relied on the 
Trustees' losing the Trustees would lose.  And of course the Trustees would lose because 
the Investors reasonably relied on the Trustees' losing because of the Investors' 
reasonable reliance on the Trustees' losing as a result of the Investors' reasonable 
reliance . . . .   
 The plain fact is that the Investors did not act reasonably or prudently if they 
relied on a calculation that there was a 100% probability that the Trustees' claim would 
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completely fail.4  (Such reliance would have been no more reasonable than reliance on a 
calculation that there was a 100% probability that fuel prices would not increase or 
any other contingency that might harm the company would not come to pass.) Instead, if the 
Investors acted reasonably and prudently, they factored into their investment decisions 
the possibility that the Trustees would be successful in whole or in part.5  And the same 
is true of the other parties that relied on the plan.  These parties, no less than the 
Investors, should have known that NewCal was obligated under section 10.1 of the plan to 
pay allowed administrative expenses and that Continental had obtained an important ruling 
from the bankruptcy court by representing that the Trustees' claim if allowed would be 
paid by NewCal under this provision.   
 In sum, entertaining the Trustees' claim on the merits would not upset any 
reasonable reliance interests.  Nor would the mere act of entertaining those claims 
imperil Continental's reorganization.  If the Trustees' claim was considered and they won 
on the merits (by no means a foregone conclusion), any threat to the reorganization could 
                     
4The majority says that the "`100% probability' factor [is] an issue the dissent has 
created."  Maj. Op. 25.  However, this "factor" is implicit in the majority's reasoning.  
If a reasonable investor would have proceeded on the basis of the calculation that there 
was, let us say, a 50% probability the Trustees would ultimately recover something on 
their claim, then I fail to see how we would necessarily be upsetting a reasonable 
reliance interest by holding that the Trustees' claim had to be entertained on the merits.
5Although actual but unreasonable reliance interests are not relevant here, I must say as 
an aside that I seriously doubt that the Investors banked on a calculation that there was 
a 100% probability that the Trustees would recover nothing.  The majority suggests that 
the district court made a "finding" that the Investors did so, but I am not sure that the 
majority has correctly interpreted what the district court wrote.  The district court 
stated:  "The Investors relied on the unstayed confirmation order in making the $450 
million investment in Continental's Plan."  J.A. at 1874.  This may mean no more than that 
the Investors, in deciding to commit the $450 million, took into account the fact that the 
plan had been confirmed and had not been stayed.  Taking these facts into account (which 
would certainly have been reasonable) is quite different from relying on a 100% 
probability that the Trustees' claim would be entirely unsuccessful.  In any event, if the 
district court meant to say the latter, neither the district court's opinion, 
Continental's brief, nor the majority's opinion cites any support in the record for this 
remarkable "finding."   
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be taken into account in framing the Trustees' relief.  What the district court and the 
majority have done -- throwing the Trustees out of court before the merits of their claim 
are even heard -- is unjustified and unjust.   
 I find it ironic that the majority invokes equity to support this result.  As 
noted, Continental argued in the bankruptcy court that the Trustees' claim, if allowed, 
would be "an Allowed Administrative Claim which would be paid in accordance with the terms 
of Section 10.1 of the Plan."  J.A. 1039.  Now, Continental contends that the Trustees' 
claim, even if valid on the merits, should not be paid under this provision. Rewarding 
such a volte-face is not my idea of equity.   
 I am also concerned about the implications of this decision for future cases.  
The majority's decision may make it imperative for appellants in cases like this to obtain 
stays.  If these appellants must post a bond in order to get a stay, then I question 
whether a stay is a realistic option in reorganizations of companies like Continental.
And if a stay is not a realistic option in such cases, then bankruptcy judges will 
exercise a distressing measure of essentially unreviewable authority.   
 For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision.  I 
would reverse the order of the district court and remand for a decision on the merits.
 
                     
6In this case, Continental sought a supersedeas bond in the amount of $450,000,000.  
J.A. at 1973.  If a bond of anything approaching this magnitude is required in cases of 
this type in order to obtain a stay, then a stay may not be realistic. 
